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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 is coming up to its fifth year since release, and is supported for another five years, until 2017.
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Server if you had installed 5.7, up to and including the 5.8 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve quite a bit of manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly what packages you have installed or removed.
So, for a default install, from release of 5.7 up to and including 5.8, we shipped 42 advisories to address 118 vulnerabilities. 4 advisories were rated critical, 13 were important, and the remaining 25 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 5.7 up to and including 5.8, we shipped 71 advisories to address 177 vulnerabilities. 7 advisories were rated critical, 16 were important, and the remaining 48 were moderate and low.
The 7 critical advisories addressed 20 critical vulnerabilities across 4 different packages:
Updates to correct 19 out of the 20 critical vulnerabilities were available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next calendar day after the issues were public. The update to krb5 took 2 calendar days because it was public on Christmas day.
Overall, for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 since release until 5.8, 98% of critical vulnerabilities have had an update available to address them available from the Red Hat Network either the same day or the next calendar day after the issue was public.
Although not in the definition of critical severity, also of interest during this period were a couple of remote denial of service flaws that were easily exploitable:
In addition, updates to Firefox, NSS, and Thunderbird were made to blacklist a compromised Certificate Authority.
To compare these statistics with previous update releases we need to take into account that the time between each update release is different. So looking at a default installation and calculating the number of advisories per month gives the following chart:
This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise Linux 5 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS did not include Firefox, but 5 Server does. You can use our public security measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any given Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
See also: 5.7, 5.6, 5.5, 5.4, 5.3, 5.2, and 5.1 risk reports.
We often wondered how the same effect would look if rendered with video. With video you've got the extra element of time, each segment of the mosaic can be running from a different starting point, with a different speed, and even a different direction. In addition the segments themselves can move over time. Would this end up with an effect that was just too much of a mess? Or would it give an effect that helps visualise the consequence of spacetime?
We started by taking several videos at three different locations over the period of a year with a Kodak Zi8 camera. A motorway bridge over the M74, just outside the Buchanan shopping center in Glasgow, and a bench in Strathclyde park. Lining up the images was done roughly by using lines drawn on acetate stuck over the camera screen.
The software to do the mosaic effect was hand-written. We used a simple scripting language, Perl, and the image library GD. On a relatively modern Linux PC running Fedora 16 we can render near real-time 720p HD even when handling 300 segments of mosaic. A simple language controls which parts of the screen come from which video, and the first half of the music video uses this with simple effects having just a few boxes overlayed:
Later in the video things get more complicated, using randomisation to pick the location and movement of each segment:
We used our scripts to create a number of ~13 second segments, then put them all together using kdenlive. The intro and outro were taken from a different video from a hotel room in London Victoria; the intro using a 'miniature' effect, and outro using the randomised segments applied to a single video.
The Perl script and a 5 frame example is available to download: 2011-sonik-vid-example.tar.bz2 (1.4M)
Watch the full video, or click through to YouTube to see it in HD:
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Server if you had installed 6.1, up to and including the 6.2 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve a bit of manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly what you have installed or removed.
So, for a default install, from release of 6.1 up to and including 6.2, we shipped 36 advisories to address 121 vulnerabilities. 2 advisories were rated critical, 10 were important, and the remaining 24 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 6.1 up to and including 6.2, we shipped 88 advisories to address 218 vulnerabilities. 10 advisories were rated critical, 16 were important, and the remaining 62 were moderate and low.
The 10 critical advisories addressed 31 critical vulnerabilities across 3 components:
Updates to correct all of the 31 critical vulnerabilities were available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next calendar day after the issues were public.
Although not in the definition of critical severity, also of interest during this period were a few flaws that were high risk or easily exploitable:
A flaw in Bind, CVE-2011-4313 fixed by RHSA-2011:1458 where a malicious client could cause Bind to stop responding, a denial of service attack. This flaw was discovered by it being accidentally triggered in the wild.
A flaw in the Apache HTTP Server, CVE-2011-3192, fixed by RHSA-2011:1245, where a remote attacker could cause a denial of service attack. This was discovered due to a public exploit.
A flaw in RPM, CVE-2011-3378 fixed by RHSA-2011:1349 where a specially-crafted RPM package that, when queried or installed, would cause rpm to crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code prior to any signature checking. We're not aware of any working exploits for this issue.
Updates to blacklist the DigiNotar Certificate Authority.
To compare these statistics with previous update releases we need to take into account that the time between each update release is different. So looking at a default installation and calculating the number of advisories per month gives the following chart:
This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise Linux 6 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install of either Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS and 6 Server does not include Firefox, but a default install of 5 Server does. You can use our public security measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any given Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
We've now created a page to give acknowledgements to the companies and individuals that report issues in our online services, such as finding a cross-site scripting flaw in a Red Hat web site, or a vulnerability in OpenShift.
So let's take a look at the most common times and days we push advisories for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, and 6 (including Supplementary) using a heatmap:
The more advisories pushed for a given date and hour, the darker that section of the graph is. So the most popular times for pushing advisories are Tuesdays at 10am and 2pm Eastern US time, Fridays are pretty light for pushes, and there was nothing during the weekends. The spread of the graph shows that we push advisories when they are ready, rather than waiting to a fixed day and time, in order to reduce the risk to users.
All the data used to create this graph is available as part of our public metrics. Thanks to Sami Kerola for the R code from which I based my graph generation.
I decided on the Liberation Sans Narrow font, drew up a string of characters in The Gimp, converted it to have only 4 levels, then used a quick perl script to convert the image into program data for the scroller. I'm pretty happy with how it turned out. The scroller, image, and script are available here.
"Red Hat knew about 51.5% of the security vulnerabilities that we fixed in advance. The average time between Red Hat knowing about an issue and it being made public was 23 days (median 10 days).... A default installation of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 AS was vulnerable to 20 critical security issues over the first six years. "
The data we publish is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise Linux, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other distributions, or operating systems. One important difference is that it is Red Hat policy to count vulnerabilities and allocate CVE names to all issues that we fix, including ones that are found internally. This is not true for many other vendors including folks like Microsoft and Adobe who do not count or disclose issues they fix which were found internally.
The table below lists all vulnerabilities which have a CVSS score of 7 or more ('high'), that we fixed in any product during calendar year 2010.
Most common CWE were:
CVE | CWE | 2011 top 25? | CVSS base score | Fixed in |
---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2007-4567 | CWE-476 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-0778 | CWE-770 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-1385 | CWE-191 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-3080 | CWE-129 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2009-3245 | CWE-252 | no | 7.6 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (openssl) |
CVE-2009-3726 | CWE-476 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4005 | CWE-127 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4027 | CWE-362 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4141 | CWE-416 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4212 | CWE-191 | no | 10.0 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (krb5) |
CVE-2009-4272 | CWE-764 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4273 | CWE-78 | yes | 7.9 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (systemtap) |
CVE-2009-4537 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2009-4895 | CWE-362 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-0008 | CWE-606 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-0291 | CWE-822 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-0738 | CWE-424 | no | 7.5 | JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 4.2, 4.3 |
CVE-2010-0741 | CWE-20 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kvm) |
CVE-2010-1084 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1086 | CWE-20 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1087 | CWE-362 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1166 | CWE-823 | no | 7.6 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (xorg-x11-server) |
CVE-2010-1173 | CWE-120 * | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1188 | CWE-416 | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1436 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-1437 | CWE-362 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2063 | CWE-823 | no | 7.5 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (samba) |
CVE-2010-2235 | CWE-77 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Network Satellite Server 5.3 (cobbler) |
CVE-2010-2240 | CWE-788 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2248 | CWE-682 | no | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2492 | CWE-805 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2521 | CWE-805 | no | 8.3 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2798 | CWE-476 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-2962 | CWE-823 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3069 | CWE-129 | no | 8.3 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, 6 (samba) |
CVE-2010-3081 | CWE-131 | yes | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, 6, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3084 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3301 | CWE-129 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3302 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan) |
CVE-2010-3308 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan) |
CVE-2010-3432 | CWE-805 * | no | 7.8 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, 6, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3705 | CWE-788 | no | 8.3 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, MRG (kernel) |
CVE-2010-3708 | CWE-77 | no | 7.5 | JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 4.3, SOA Platform 4.2 |
CVE-2010-3752 | CWE-78 | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan) |
CVE-2010-3753 | CWE-78 | yes | 7.1 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan) |
CVE-2010-3847 | CWE-426 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (glibc) |
CVE-2010-3856 | CWE-426 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (glibc) |
CVE-2010-3864 | CWE-362 | no | 7.6 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openssl) |
CVE-2010-3904 | CWE-822 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (kernel) |
CVE-2010-4170 | CWE-88 | no | 7.2 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, 6 (systemtap) |
CVE-2010-4179 | CWE-862 | yes | 7.5 | Red Hat Enterprise MRG (cumin) |
CVE-2010-4344 | CWE-120 | yes | 7.5 | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (exim) |
* - in both these cases the outcome is not a buffer overflow as the possible overflow is detected and instead converted into an abort (DoS)
See also our 2010 analysis